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SUMMARY 
This short paper presents the findings of a survey Demos carried 
out in London in the wake of Osama Bin Laden’s death.  Over a 
period of two days (May 4th and 5th), we interviewed a broadly 
representative sample of over a hundred Londoners to determine 
their views about the impact of Bin Laden’s death. 
The survey revealed: 
 High levels of scepticism amongst Londoners about the official 
reports of his killing. Approximately 2 out of 5 respondents 
either denied he was actually dead or expressed scepticism and 
uncertainty over whether he was in fact dead.1  
 Londoners felt the death of Bin Laden will have a negative effect 
on their short-term safety. Approximately 1 out of 3 
respondents reported feeling less safe using public transport 
following his death, while 54 per cent expressed concern that 
there would be an increased risk of terrorism in the next 6 
months. In the longer term, just less than half of those surveyed 
did not think that the risk of terrorism would increase in the 
long term.  
 Londoners were also split over the morality and legitimacy of 
the US killing, with only 2 in 5 (39 per cent) supporting 
American actions. Men were more likely than women to think 
killing Osama Bin Laden was the right thing to do.  
We draw two broad policy implications from these survey findings.   
First, the security services and police must do more to communicate 
to the public their capacity to prevent revenge and future attacks. 
The security services should give consideration to making more 
frequent public pronouncements that ought to include the broad 
number of people they are monitoring, the current threat level, and 
details of successful counter-terror operations. Care should also be 
taken to place such pronouncements in the historical context of the 
state’s counter terrorism efforts so as to provide reassurance that 
progress is being made against extremist elements. 
Second, the American government must consider how it can 
enhance overseas perceptions of its credibility and honesty. A first 
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step could be a limited release of a photograph of Bin Laden’s body, 
or sharing DNA samples with independent medical experts. 
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BACKGROUND 
Osama Bin Laden has been the public face of Islamic terrorism for 
almost a decade. The failure of coalition forces to apprehend him 
has long been a source of embarrassment for the US and her allies; 
in finding and executing him, President Obama has exorcised a 
powerful demon from the US psyche.  
There are significant and well-founded reasons for the US pursuit of 
Bin Laden, not least because of his declaration of war against the 
US and his direct involvement in a range of atrocious attacks from 
the 1998 US African Embassy bombings to 9/11. Nevertheless, it 
remains unclear what the significance of his death will be in the 
broader context of the War on Terror.  
Previous analysis had suggested that Bin Laden’s isolation reduced 
his involvement in the operations of Al-Qaeda, relegating his role to 
that of ‘brand ambassador’ for the international Jihad2; if this were 
the case then the significance of his execution would lie in its 
symbolism, making it a victory which may psychologically affect 
those allied with him, but would not necessarily limit the 
operational effectiveness of the various Al-Qaeda affiliates. More 
recent reports have painted a different picture, suggesting that he 
was active in decision-making and planning.3 If this is the case his 
death may prove a significant structural blow for Al-Qaeda.  
The killing of Bin Laden is clearly a major success for the US 
intelligence services, which may enjoy an increase in confidence in 
its abilities as a result. Public trust and confidence is vital to 
intelligence work, yet the CIA, MI5 and other Western intelligence 
agencies are subject to significant levels of distrust due to historical 
mistakes and the inevitable secrecy of their work. The poor 
handling of the event’s aftermath by the Obama administration, 
including inconsistencies in both official and media accounts of the 
circumstances, governmental reluctance to release a picture of his 
body, and his hasty burial at sea, have lent some support to the 
views of sceptics and conspiracy theorists. While a recent 
communiqué from Al Qaeda confirming his death may do much to 
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quash the cynicism of all but the most hard-core sceptics, the 
distrust of the US Government is in itself a deeply troubling issue.4 
In terms of public perception, a recent USA Today/Gallup poll 
found that 54 per cent of Americans now feel safer than before Bin 
Laden’s death.5 At the time of our survey last week there was no 
quantifiable evidence about how his death was viewed by 
Londoners as the population of the UK city considered most likely 
to face a terrorist attack. To help see how Londoners viewed the 
issues surrounding Bin Laden’s death, Demos conducted a survey 
across five different areas of London: Whitechapel, Moorgate / the 
City, Bloomsbury, Covent Garden / Leicester Square, and Elephant 
& Castle. In each area we interviewed between 20 and 25 people, 
taking care to ensure that our sample was broadly reflective of 
Greater London in terms of gender and ethnicity. We found 
differences of opinions between men and women, but there were no 
statistically significant differences across ethnic groups. Our 
findings are detailed below. 
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FINDINGS 
Doing the right thing: killing Osama Bin Laden 
 
It's not the end of it, it's going to cause more [terrorism]. I mean the 
people that he worked with and his views on terrorism [pause] he 
wasn't the only one. 
Black woman, early 20s 
It’s a good step, much appreciated. 
Asian man, mid-30s 
The most divisive issue for those surveyed was the morality and 
legitimacy of the US decision to kill Bin Laden. Contrary to 
President Obama’s statement that ‘his demise should be welcomed 
by all who believe in peace and human dignity,’ only 39 per cent of 
Londoners supported his killing, with 35 per cent against and 25 
per cent undecided.   
Those who supported the killing felt that it was a legitimate 
response to the man who had declared war against the US and was 
responsible for the deaths of many: 
It affected a lot of people. You know, people want...to see what these 
collective governments could do about it after the severity of the 
atrocities committed in America... If he was caught, he shouldn’t expect 
to have a very good ending. 
 Black man, mid-30s  
In contrast, those who opposed the killing often expressed that Bin 
Laden ought to have been taken alive and tried in court as a 
criminal: 
 It’s not right to kill him. We can’t say on the one hand don’t be brutal 
and then, like, you know, kill him in cold blood. It’s not right. It should 
have gone to court.  
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White man, early 20s 
The responses of those interviewed may reflect the shifting 
understanding of war in the 21st century, a problem that continues 
to complicate Anglo-American efforts to combat terrorism. The 
question of whether terrorists should be tried in a court of law as 
criminals, or executed in the field as enemy combatants, will 
doubtless remain contentious. The apparent emphasis on killing, as 
opposed to capturing Bin Laden arguably highlights a continuation 
of the US policy of treating terrorists as combatants, suggesting that 
the difficulties of trying and detaining terrorists continue to 
influence the US Presidency’s handling of the war against al-Qaeda.   
Public Safety: The Risk of Terrorism 
It’s pretty hard to predict I’d say. It could go either way. Make it worse, 
make it better....it’s hard to say. 
White woman, mid-20s 
It’s going to encourage Al-Qaeda to retaliate back at the US and 
England…we could have another 9/11. 
Black woman, mid-20s 
Significant numbers of Londoners expressed concern about the 
increased risk of terrorism following Bin Laden’s death.  
Of those surveyed, almost 1 in 3 felt less safe using public transport 
following his death. A majority of people surveyed (54 per cent) 
thought that Bin Laden’s killing would increase the likelihood of 
attack in London over the next 6 months, while 60 per cent were 
either worried about or unsure of the long-term risk.  Only 40 per 
cent felt that his death would not increase the chance of terrorism in 
the long term.   
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Distrust: Conspiracy and the US Government Reports 
It could all be one big conspiracy...it’s about money, and that’s it. 
White man, early 20s 
I think it’s all just media hype, very convenient that it happened the day 
after Gaddafi’s son was killed. 
South Asian woman, mid-20s 
 
I can’t really see the American Government really staging this kind of 
thing. If it were the case then Bin Laden could, you know, reveal himself 
to the public and then, you know, be a huge blow for the US and so there 
would be no reason for them to do that. 
White man, early 20s 
[The] Americans wouldn't have gone there and made up media 
coverage to fool the world. 
Black man, late 40s 
Data from the survey evidenced a low level of belief among those 
surveyed in official US reports of Bin Laden’s death. As the survey 
was undertaken prior to the official Al-Qaeda acknowledgement of 
the death, these results may no longer accurately reflect the feelings 
of those surveyed.  
Nevertheless, the level of popular belief in the accuracy of the 
American reports of his death was remarkably low, with 2 out of 5 
Londoners (40 per cent) unconvinced by reports of his death. City 
workers were the least sceptical with 82 per cent accepting the 
official US reports as true. Of those unconvinced by reports of the 
death, concerns were commonly expressed about the absence of a 
body or external validation of DNA by independent experts.  A 
range of possible conspiracy theories were advanced to explain why 
the reports of his death could not be deemed reliable, though 
interestingly, no single theory was particularly common. The 
distrust of American institutional honesty was the only clear and 
consistent theme.  
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IMPLICATIONS 
The issues of terrorism and public perception are hugely complex, 
and subject to variance on the basis of many factors for which a 
small study cannot control. Our recommendations based on this 
survey should not be read as a catch-all solution, but rather, as a 
‘nudge in the right direction’ toward increasing governmental 
transparency in an effort to build public trust and mitigate fear and 
uncertainty. They are supplemented by previous Demos research 
into conspiracy theories and trust in government as presented in 
The Power of Unreason. 
It is clear from our findings that a significant percentage of the 
London population feel a great degree of uncertainty about the risk 
of terrorism in both the short and long-term. On one hand, this fear 
and uncertainty is characteristic of 21st century terrorist attacks 
including 9/11, the Madrid bombings, and the 7/7 bombings among 
a range of other successful and failed attacks. The perpetrators of 
these attacks walk among us unnoticed, and deliberately target the 
day-to-day aspects of our lives, such as public transport. A unique 
feature of modern terrorism is the fact that a very small number of 
people (even just one person) can cause a huge amount of death and 
destruction, making the task of the security services and the police 
incredibly difficult.  No matter how good the security services are 
and how much is invested in counter-terrorism, there will inevitably 
be another successful attack at some point – such is the nature of 
the threat.   
The security and intelligence services in the UK and in other 
countries have significantly improved their capabilities over the 
past ten years to identify and dismantle potential terrorist plots. 
While it is impossible to prevent every attack, the counter-terror 
effort in this country has been amongst the most successful in the 
world, with no civilians killed in Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist attacks 
against targets on the mainland since 2005.  
This success stands in stark contrast to the relative silence of the 
security services in discussing successful operations, perhaps 
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reflecting a fear of being seen as complacent, particularly if such a 
pronouncement were to be followed by a successful attack.  The 
government and security services are clearly good at highlighting 
the existence of a threat, yet fail to communicate to the public their 
assessment about how well they are doing in their efforts to protect 
us. 
With this in mind, the security services should also focus on 
combating what many have identified as the principal risk of 
terrorism – its ability to induce fear in the broader population. 
Merely doing a good job of countering the terrorist threat is not 
enough – the security services must be seen to do a good job by the 
public at large.  
The dominant public message from the security and intelligence 
services highlights the severity of the risk we face without providing 
any greater insight into how the threat and our ability to handle it 
have evolved.  
The most recent pronouncement by the security services pertaining 
to the number of people under surveillance in this country came in 
2007 when MI5 confirmed that it was monitoring over 2,000 
individuals and 300 potential plots.6 Following this announcement 
there has been no public acknowledgement as to whether this 
number has increased or decreased.   
The fact that the work of the security services necessarily takes 
place in secret means that they will always be subject to operational 
constraints regarding what information can be shared, and will 
likely remain a subject of public distrust. However, the security 
services could do well to combat this by giving more frequent and 
forthcoming status reports about the threat from terrorist groups as 
do, for example, the Dutch security services, who publish more 
detailed assessments of the evolution of the threat in the 
Netherlands.7 The UK security services should consider producing 
something similar. We recommend that an annual counter- 
terrorism threat report should be published, which should include 
information on the number of individuals that the security services 
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are monitoring and analysis as to whether the threat appears to be 
increasing or decreasing. 
Regarding the distrust of official US Government reports, our 
research indicates that, far from being the exclusive preserve of a 
lunatic fringe, distrust of the American Government is widespread. 
The USA is subject to a negative perception by a significant 
proportion of Londoners, with large percentages distrusting their 
official reports of Bin Laden’s death and disagreeing with their 
decision to execute him in Pakistan. While it is hard to believe that 
any short-term measures could eradicate this scepticism, the 
release of additional evidence into the public domain – including 
limited release photos of his body and providing DNA samples to 
independent examiners – could help to reduce the uncertainty that 
many feel regarding his death. In the long term, the US Government 
must give greater consideration to building trust and enhancing 
governmental transparency in order to portray a more favourable 
international image.   
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METHOD 
A weighted quota sample of 108 participants was recruited from five 
sites across central London on the 4th and 5th May 2011. Participants 
were recruited according to tight quotas for ethnicity and gender 
derived from 2007 London population estimates produced by the 
Office for National Statistics.8 
All participants completed a semi-structured interview comprising 
5 closed and 2 open questions. These were clustered around two 
broad research ‘themes’ – the presentation of Bin Laden’s death and 
its impact on the risk of terrorism. Questions were selected 
following discussion between academic experts and members of the 
Demos team, and were validated and revised following a brief pilot 
run prior to the main study.  
Participant responses were recorded using a paper report form and 
full-length audio recording. Following completion of the data 
collection all audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and cross 
referenced against the paper report forms to reduce the risk of 
human error in data recording.  
Quantitative analysis was conducted using simple descriptive 
statistics, while qualitative data analysis employed a reflexive 
coding process. Participants were coded against both a priori and 
emergent themes, before consideration was made of the 
interrelationships between these themes and the quantitative data. 
Additional qualitative data outside of the answers to specific 
questions were considered in the analysis stage as indicative of 
broader participant ‘sentiment’, and have been used to provide 
further illumination of the quantitative results.  
Ethical considerations around participant confidentiality and data 
security were observed; no data capable of identifying participants 
were recorded and all participants were informed of their right to 
withdraw from the research. 
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